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MATERIAL WITNESS DETENTION

"The duty to disclose knowledge of crime... is so
vital that one known to be innocent may be detained,

in the absence of bail, as a material witness."1
INTRODUCTION

A material witness is an individual who has unique
information about a crime, beneficial to defense or prosecution.
The United States has a history of authorizing and sanctioning
the custodial detention of such witnesses to ensure their
appearance and testimony at relevant court proceedings.
Indeed, not only is there a federal material witness statute, 2 but
3
most states also have a material witness law.
The manner in which material witnesses are treated
presents a dilemma between the constitutional rights of the
individual and the needs of the criminal justice system.
Typically, after a person is a witness to criminal activity and is
deemed to have "material information" pertaining to the crime,
the government is allowed to detain them if the requirements of
the applicable material witness law are met.4
Material
witnesses may be required to post a bond or undergo a form of
recognizance to ensure their presence at the criminal proceeding.
If the witness refuses, or is unable to guarantee his return, these
statutes allow the witness to be incarcerated for an indefinite
5
period of time.
The detention of material witnesses should be a seldom-used
procedure. Recent events, however, particularly the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, have brought
material witness laws to the forefront as the government seeks
to use the laws as investigatory tools to detain individuals while
1 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 184 (1953).

See 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000).
See Ronald L. Carlson & Mark S. Voelpel, Material Witness and Material
Injustice, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 3 (1980) (noting that at least forty-five states have
material witness laws); Joseph Casula & Morgan Dowd, Comment, The Plight of the
Detained Material Witness, 7 CATH. U. L. REV. 37, 38 (1958) (stating "every [U.S.]
jurisdiction" either permits or requires a recognizance of a material witness).
4 See Stacey M. Studnicki, Material Witness Detention: Justice Served or
Denied?, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1533, 1554 (1994) (noting a judicial officer may arrest a
material witness once the requirements of the federal material witness statute have
been satisfied).
5 See id.; see also Carlson & Voelpel, supra note 3, at 3.
2

3
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determining whether a crime has been committed by the
detainee or perhaps by an acquaintance of the detainee. 6 Such
"investigatory detentions" are not only a misuse of the material
witness
laws,
but
also
troubling
and
potentially
7
unconstitutional.
Material witness law is unique because of the potential carte
blanche it provides to the government and law enforcement
officials who may abuse it. In the aftermath of the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) has been accused of misusing the material witness law to
detain people while investigating their backgrounds and
activities.8
Indeed, the United States Attorney General
announced that the "aggressive detention" of material witnesses
in the wake of September 11th would be the norm. 9 The secrecy
surrounding the detention of material witnesses adds to the
potential for misuse of this authority as an investigatory tool,
rather than a legitimate means of obtaining testimony or
protecting a witness. Further, it is easier to arrest an individual
as a material witness than as a criminal defendant since there is
no required showing of probable cause that the witness has
committed a crime. 10
This Article will trace the origins of the authority to detain
witnesses from early common law through modern criminal law
and procedure. It will also analyze the federal material witness
statute and examine the requirements mandated by law in order
6 See John Riley, Held Without Charge: Material Witness Law Puts Detainees in
Legal Limbo, NEWSDAY, Sept. 18, 2002, at A6 (noting the federal government has
interpreted the statute as permitting detention of people who it suspects "might be
up to no good or might be withholding information," before it has enough evidence to
charge those people with a crime).
7 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). Officers are allowed to momentarily
stop and detain an individual in order to engage in brief questioning. This is
permitted without probable cause, but the officers must have a reasonable suspicion
that the person is involved in criminal activity in order to effectuate the stop and
detention. Id.; see also United States v. Grant, 920 F.2d 376, 384 (6th Cir. 1990).
8 See Riley, supra note 6 (noting that critics have accused the government of
"turn[ing] a narrow law designed to assist the judicial process into a broad
preventive detention statute" that gives the government overly broad arrest powers
that are "vulnerable to misjudgments and abuse").
9 See Cam Simpson, Roundup Unnerves Oklahoma Muslims, CHI. TRIB., Apr.
21, 2002, at 1 (quoting Attorney General John Ashcroft).
10 See Grant, 920 F.2d at 384 (noting police officers may detain witnesses for
questioning without demonstrating he or she has probable cause to believe the
witness is involved in a crime).
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to detain a witness.
Finally, the Article will discuss
investigatory detention practices by the government and propose
changes to the current material witness laws in order to prevent
such abuses in the future.
I.

A.

THE HISTORY OF MATERIAL WITNESS DETENTION

Witnesses Under the Common Law

Prior to the year 1400, the modern witness was practically
unknown in jury trials, and it was not until the 1500s that the
witness became a common figure in trials and a source of
12
information for the jury." In 1562, the Statute of Elizabeth
originated the imposition of a penalty and a civil cause of action
against any person who refused to testify after being served with
process and given expenses. 13 Consequently, "[t]his statute did
for testimony at common law what the subpoena had done for
14
testimony in chancery more than one hundred years" earlier.
The Statute of Elizabeth, however, applied only to civil
proceedings.15

In criminal cases, the date when process began to be issued
for the Crown's witnesses is debatable. 16 The Second Act of
11 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2190, at 62 (John T. McNaughton
rev., 1961). Prior to that time, jurors fulfilled the role of both trier and witness.
Their personal knowledge of the events in question was a chief source of the
information which today is furnished by ordinary witnesses. Id.
12 Statute of Elizabeth, 1562-63, 5 Eliz., c. 9, § 12 (Eng.):
If any person or persons upon whom any process out of any of the courts of
record within this realm or Wales shall be served to testify or depose
concerning any cause or matter depending in any of the same courts, and
having tendered unto him or them, according to his or their countenance or
calling, such reasonable sums of money for his or their costs or charges as
having regard to the distance of the places is necessary to be allowed in
that behalf, do not appear according to the tenor of the said process, having
not a lawful and reasonable let or impediment to the contrary, that then
the party making default (shall forfeit £10 and give further recompense for
the harm suffered by the party aggrieved).
WIGMORE, supra note 11, § 2190, at 65 n.17.
13 WIGMORE, supra note 11, § 2190, at 65. These prospective witnesses were
given expenses to encourage their presence at trial, as required by the Statute of
Elizabeth. Id.
14 Id. According to Wigmore, this statute not only typified the duty of being a
witness, but represented the right to appear and testify, free from the threat of
being sued for "maintenance" as a meddlesome witness. Id. § 2190, at 65 n.18.
15 Id. § 2190, at 67.
16 Id. Wigmore asserts that compulsory process for witnesses in criminal cases
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Philip and Mary in 1555 enabled "the Crown [to] bind over
witnesses to appear [at criminal trials] and compel them to
testify against the accused." 17 The accused in a criminal trial
was not allowed to have defense witnesses until the late 1600s,
when general statutes guaranteed compulsory process.18
The Court of Chancery in England recognized a definite
testimonial compulsion and duty much earlier than the common
law courts, as evidenced by the invention of the subpoena writ in
the late 1300s. 19 Thus, the equitable courts had more than a
century's start on the common law courts in establishing the
power to compel witnesses to testify. 20 "[The] rapid increase in
the activity of the Chancery during the 1500s was one of the
causes which contributed to the introduction at that time of
compulsory process for witnesses in the common law
courts

.

"..
."21

The emergence of the law securing accused persons the right
to compulsory process for witnesses cured a defect of the common
"presumably ...preceded the time of Elizabeth's statute," but does not give an exact
year. Id. In Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1910), it was stated:
Prior to [Elizabeth's] statute, there must have been a power in the crown
(for it would have been utterly impossible to carry on the administration of
justice without such power) to require the attendance in courts of justice of
persons capable of giving evidence, and the production of documents
material to the cause, though in the possession of a stranger.
Id. at 373.
17 Casula & Dowd, supra note 3, at 37-38. The statute provided:
And be it further enacted, That the said Justices shall have Authority by
this Act, to bind all such be Recognizance or Obligation, as do declare any
Thing material to prove the said Manslaughter or Felony against such
Prisoner as shall be so committed to Ward, to appear at the next general
Gaol-delivery to be holden within the County, City or Town Corporate
where the Trial of the Said Manslaughter or Felony shall be, then and
there to give Evidence against the Party.
Id. at 38 n.4 (quoting 1555, 2 & 3 Phil. & M., c. 10 (Eng.)).
18 WIGMORE, supra note 11, § 2190, at 67. Critics have disagreed and argued
that the subpoena existed earlier in other processes. Id. § 2190, at 68 n.28.
19 Id. § 2190, at 67-68.
20 Id. According to Wigmore, the subpoena writ was first used by the clerks in
Chancery in the latter end of the reign of Edward III, about 1375. Id. § 2190, at 65
n.19.
21 Id.

There had been before that time no compulsion; and the poena of centum
libri effectually supplied the compulsion. We may well understand that a
'revolution in equitable proceedings' was by this sub poena clause brought
about. This and the Statute of Elizabeth mark an epoch in the history of
legal theory and practice.
Id. § 2190, at 65-66 n.19.
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law by giving the criminally accused the right already possessed
both by parties in civil cases and by the prosecution in criminal
cases. 22 By 1612, in The Countess of Shrewsbury's Case,23 Lord
Bacon declared that "all subjects, without distinction of degrees,
owe to the King tribute and service, not only of their deed and
hand, but of their knowledge and discovery." 24 The compulsion
of Crown witnesses to appear and testify was firmly established
by 1695, when the Act of William III gave "parties indicted for
treason... like process to compel their witnesses to appear as
was usually granted to compel witnesses appearing against
25

them."

B.

Early American FederalLaw

The First Judiciary Act of 178926 regulated the examination
of witnesses in United States courts. The Act recognized the
duty of witnesses to appear and testify.2 7 The Act also codified
the authority to require recognizance of material witnesses in
criminal proceedings and to imprison them upon failure to do
so.28 In 1869, the Act was relied upon in one of the earliest
22

Id. § 2191, at 68.

77 Eng. Rep. 1369 (KB. 1612).
Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279-80 (1918) (quoting The Countess of
Shewsbury's Case).
25 Id. at 280 (citing Act of William III, 1695, 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3, § 7 (Eng.)). The
"duty" of private citizens to provide assistance to the courts and legal system, when
called upon to do so, is a longstanding tradition. "Still, as in the days of Edward I,
the citizenry may be called upon to enforce the justice of the state, not faintly and
with lagging steps, but honestly and bravely and with whatever implements and
facilities are convenient and at hand." Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 164 N.E.
726, 727 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.); see also In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 535 (1895)
("It is the duty... of every citizen, to assist in prosecuting, and in securing the
punishment of, any breach of the peace of the United States.").
26 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 30, 33, 1 Stat. 73.
27 See id. § 30, 1 Stat. at 88-90. The Act provided for taking the depositions in
civil cases of "any person ...who shall live at a greater distance from the place of
trial than one hundred miles, or is bound on a voyage to sea, or is about to go out of
the United States, or out of such district .... or is ancient or very infirm." Id. § 30, 1
Stat. at 88. It also provided that "any person may be compelled to appear and [be]
depose[d], and allowed if witness could not be produced at trial, the deposition could
be used in their place." Id. § 30, 1 Stat. at 89.
28 Id. § 33, 1 Stat. at 91. This section stated, in pertinent part:
[Clopies of the process [against the accused] shall be returned as speedily
as may be into the clerk's office of such court, together with the
recognizances of the witnesses for their appearance to testify in the case;
which recognizances the magistrate before whom the examination shall be,
may require on pain of imprisonment.
23
24
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material witness cases, United States v. Durling,29 which
discussed the imprisonment of material witnesses upon failure to
post bond.
The federal authority to arrest and detain witnesses
continued by statute until 1948. 30 At that time, the United
States Congress repealed the statutory provisions in the federal
criminal laws that gave the authority to arrest material
witnesses. 31 28 U.S.C. § 657, repealed in a general revision of
Title 18 in 1948, provided:
Any judge or other officer who may be authorized to arrest and
imprison or bail persons charged with any crime or offense
against the United States may, at the hearing of any such
charge, require of any witness produced against the prisoner,
on pain of imprisonment, a recognizance, with or without
sureties, in his discretion, for his appearance to testify in the
case. And where the crime or offense is charged to have been
committed on the high seas, or elsewhere within the admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, he may, in his
discretion, require a like recognizance, with such sureties as he
may deem necessary, of any witness produced in behalf of the
accused whose testimony, in his opinion, is important and is in
32
danger of being otherwise lost.

The companion statute, 28 U.S.C. § 659, also repealed, was
even more important because it contained the only express
reference to an authority to arrest a witness:
Any judge of the United States, on the application of a district
attorney, and on being satisfied by proof that the testimony of
any person is competent and will be necessary on the trial of
any criminal proceeding in which the United States are parties
or are interested, may compel such person to give recognizance,
with or without sureties, at his discretion, to appear to testify

therein; and, for that purpose, may issue a warrant against
such person, under his hand, with or without seal, directed to

the marshal or other officer authorized to execute process in
behalf of the United States, to arrest and bring before him such
person.
Id.

If the person so arrested neglects or refuses to give

29

25 F. Cas. 944 (N.D. Ill. 1869) (No. 15,010).

30

See Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 1971); see also Act of

Aug. 8, 1846, ch. 98, § 7, 9 Stat. 73-74 (authorizing witness detainment); 28 U.S.C.
§§ 657, 659 (1940) (repealed 1948).
31 Bacon, 449 F.2d at 938.
32 28 U.S.C. § 657 (1940) (repealed 1948); see also Bacon, 449 F.2d at 938 n.5.
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recognizance in the manner required, the judge may issue a
warrant of commitment against him, and the officer shall
convey him to the prison mentioned therein. And the said
person shall remain in confinement until he is removed to the
court for the purpose of giving his testimony, or until he gives
33
the recognizance required by said judge.
After the repeal of sections 657 and 659, there was no formal
authority to arrest material witnesses because the newly enacted
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure did not explicitly mention
There is evidence, however, that Congress
such arrests. 34
35
thought the new rules provided such authority.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(b), before it was
amended to conform to the Bail Reform Act of 1966, read as
follows:
If it appears by affidavit that the testimony of a person is
material in any criminal proceeding and if it is shown that it
may become impracticable to secure his presence by subpoena,
the court or commissioner may require him to give bail for his
appearance as a witness, in an amount fixed by the court or
commissioner. If the person fails to give bail the court or
commissioner may commit him to the custody of the marshal
pending final disposition of the proceeding in which the
testimony is needed, may order his release if he has been
detained for an unreasonable length of time and may modify at
36
any time the requirement as to bail.
Thus, the statutory authority to arrest and detain material
witnesses, which had existed from 1789 to 1948, was not
necessarily interrupted by the 1948 repeal of the material
witness statutes.3 7 Instead, "with the enactment of Rule 46(b)
the revisors [sic] of Title 18 considered sections 657 and 659 [of
The authority to arrest
Title 28] to be... redund[ant]." 38
material witnesses was thought to arise by implication from the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 39 An examination of Rule
33 28 U.S.C. § 659 (1940) (repealed 1948); see also Bacon, 449 F.2d at 938 n.5.
34 Bacon, 449 F.2d at 938.
35 Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 80-304, at 9 (1947)).
36 FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(b) (1946) (amended 1966).
37 Bacon, 449 F.2d at 938.
38 Id.
39 Id. In Bacon, the petitioner argued that the government lacked the power to

arrest her as a material witness because Rule 46(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 3149, the
material witness statute in effect at that time, did not provide for arrest. The court
concluded, however, that omitting the authority to arrest witnesses in the 1948
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46(b) confirms this, as it specifically mentions the requirement of
bail and conditions of release if the witness "has been detained
for an unreasonable length of time. '40 Presumably, absent the
prior arrest of the witness, such phrases would have been
unnecessary in the Rule.
C.

The Bail Reform Act

The enactment of the Bail Reform Act of 196641 continued
the legislative directive regarding detention of material
witnesses. 18 U.S.C. § 3149, prior to repeal in 1984, read as
follows:
If it appears by affidavit that the testimony of a person is
material in any criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it
may become impracticable to secure his presence by subpoena,
a judicial officer shall impose conditions of release pursuant to
section 3146. No material witness shall be detained because of
inability to comply with any condition of release if the
testimony of such witness can adequately be secured by
deposition, and further detention is not necessary to prevent a
failure of justice. Release may be delayed for a reasonable
period of time until the deposition of the witness can42be taken
pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The Bail Reform Act of 1966 did not specifically authorize
43
the arrest of witnesses; rather, it provided for their release.
This omission was cured in 1984 when Congress amended the
Act. 44 The reported history of the new statute reveals that two
significant changes were made from the old law pertaining to
material witnesses. First, by providing that a material witness
be treated in accordance with section 3142 (pertaining to the
release or detention of a defendant pending trial), the new
statute permits the judge to "order the detention of the witness if
there were no conditions of release that would assure [the]
revision of the federal laws was inadvertent, stating, "On balance, a grant of power
to arrest material witnesses can fairly be inferred from Rule 46(b) and from § 3149
as well." Id. at 937; see also Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 3144, 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 3211-12 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3144).
40

FED R. CRIM. P. 46(b) (1946) (amended 1966).

Act of June 22, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 3(a), 80 Stat. 216 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3149 (repealed 1984)).
42 18 U.S.C. § 3149 (1970) (repealed 1984).
43 Bacon, 449 F.2d at 937.
44 Act of Oct. 12, 1984, § 3144, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3211. The Bail Reform Act
as amended in 1984 is reported at 18 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq.
41
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appearance [of the witness]." 45
This cured the ambiguous
language in the repealed statute requiring the conditional
release of the witness in the same manner as a defendant
awaiting trial.46 This revision, however, also opened the door to
the potential abusive treatment of material witnesses, since
witnesses now can be treated in the same manner as a criminal
defendant.

47

The second change in the law was to finally grant the court
specific authority to arrest the witness. 48
This cured the
omission of express arrest authority that troubled the court in
Bacon v. United States,49 because the old statute authorized
release conditions but not the initial arrest. The current federal
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144, clearly authorizes the arrest and
detention of material witnesses:
If it appears from an affidavit filed by a party that the
testimony of a person is material in a criminal proceeding, and
if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure the
presence of the person by subpoena, a judicial officer may order
the arrest of the person and treat the person in accordance with
the provisions of section 3142 of this title. No material witness
may be detained because of inability to comply with any
condition of release if the testimony of such witness can
adequately be secured by deposition, and if further detention is
not necessary to prevent a failure of justice. Release of a
material witness may be delayed for a reasonable period of time
until the deposition of the witness can be taken pursuant to the
50
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
D. The FederalRules of CriminalProcedure
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were amended in
51
1966 and 1984 to conform to the amended Bail Reform Act.
The current Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46 cites the Bail
52
Reform Act as controlling in all questions of bail prior to trial.

In addition, the rule places responsibility for supervising the

45
46

Id.

Id.

47 Id.
48

Id.

49 449 F.2d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 1971).
50 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000).
51 3 MATTHEW BENDER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE HANDBOOK 581 (1990).
52

Id.
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pretrial detention of witnesses directly upon the district court
and requires the government attorney to make a biweekly report
to the court regarding the status of all defendants and witnesses
held in custody. 53 Furthermore, the government attorney must
54
indicate why each witness should not be deposed and released.
On April
29, 2002,
the Supreme Court,
upon
recommendation by the Judicial Conference of the United States,
proposed several amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. 55 Unless Congress alters the amendments, they will
take effect December 1, 2002. The Court rejected an amendment
to Rule 26 that would have permitted use of two-way video
transmissions to take testimony of unavailable witnesses, noting
potential conflict with the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment. 56 The proposed amendment would have allowed
video testimony in those cases in which deposition testimony
could be used under Rule 15. 57 An amendment to Rule 46 has
been approved, however, which would delete the requirement
that the government file biweekly reports with the court
58
concerning the status of defendants in detention.
II.

THE FEDERAL MATERIAL WITNESS STATUTE

The current federal material witness statute, 18 U.S.C.
59
§ 3144, was enacted in 1984 as part of the Bail Reform Act.
The statute outlines the procedure that must be followed to
secure the detention of a witness in a federal trial. The party
asserting that the testimony of the witness is "material" in a
criminal proceeding must file an affidavit. 60 The party seeking
53 FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(g).
54 Id. This conforms with the federal material witness statute, as reported in its
legislative history: "However, the Committee stresses that whenever possible, the
depositions of such witnesses should be obtained so that they may be released from
custody." Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.)
3211.
5 Journalof Proceedings, 71 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2039 (May 1, 2002).
56

Id.

See id. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15 provides for the testimony of a
prospective witness, in "exceptional circumstances," to be taken by deposition upon
motion of the party presenting that witness. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a)(1). If a witness
is detained as a material witness under 18 U.S.C. § 3144, Rule 15 provides that the
court, upon written motion of the witness and notice to the parties, may allow the
witness' deposition to be taken and the witness discharged. Id. at 15(a)(2).
58 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(g), amended by FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(h).
59 See Act of Oct. 12, 1984, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3211.
60 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000).
57
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the witness's detention must demonstrate that it may become
6 1 If
impracticable to secure the witness's presence by subpoena.
the judicial officer is satisfied that these requirements have been
met, the witness may be arrested and treated as a person
charged with committing a crime. 62 The statute governing the
release or detention of a criminal defendant pending trial is then
invoked. 63 After appearing before a judicial officer, the witness
can be released without conditions, released subject to
conditions, or detained. 64 If the judicial officer issues an order
releasing the witness, the release can be on personal
recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance
bond. 65 Alternatively, the court can impose a condition or
combination of conditions for the release of the witness. 66 If the
court orders the witness detained, the detention may be
68
temporary6 7 or indefinite.

Although courts did not provide counsel for indigent
material witnesses prior to 1985, In Re Class Action Application
61 Id.; see also Act of Oct. 12, 1984, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3211.
62 18 U.S.C. § 3144; see also Act of Oct. 12, 1984, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3211. "A

material witness warrant [like any other arrest warrant] must be based on probable
cause." United States v. Feingold, 416 F. Supp. 627, 628 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
63 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142.
64 Id. § 3142(a).
65 Id. § 3142(a)(1).

Id. § 3142(a)(2). Section 3142(g)(1)-(4) provides:
The judicial officer shall, in determining whether there are conditions of
release that will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as
required and the safety of any other person and the community, take into
account the available information concerning(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including
whether the offense is a crime of violence or involves a narcotic drug;
(2) the weight of the evidence against the person;
(3) the history and characteristics of the person, including(A)the person's character, physical and mental condition, family
ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the
community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to
drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning
appearance at court proceedings; and
(B)whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the
person was on probation, on parole, or on other release pending
trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense
under Federal, State, or local law; and
(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the
community that would be posed by the person's release.
Id. § 3142(g)(1)-(4).
67 Id. § 3142(a)(3), (e).
68 See id. § 3142(a)(4).
66
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For Habeas Corpus ("Class Action")6 9 held that incarcerated
material witnesses had a Fifth Amendment due process right to
appointment of counsel.7 0 The Class Action court observed that
under federal law, material witnesses were to be treated in
accordance with the statute that sets bail for criminal
defendants. 7 1 The bail statute, the court noted, provides for the
appointment of counsel for indigent criminal defendants. 72 The
court concluded that Congress intended to provide a right to
counsel in material witness cases, 7 3 that the Fifth Amendment
required appointment of counsel, 74 and that appointment of
counsel was necessary to avoid extended incarceration of
75
witnesses.
Under the federal material witness statute, it is common
practice to obtain an arrest warrant for a material witness. Such
a warrant must be based on probable cause, which consists of
77
two elements:7 6 the testimony of the person must be material,
and it must be impracticable to secure the person's presence by
subpoena. 78 Both of these requirements have been challenged in

69 612 F. Supp. 940 (W.D. Tex. 1985) ("ClassAction").
70 Id. at 943-44.
71 Id. at 942-43 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142). Section 3142 provides for the release
or detention of defendants and witnesses pending trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3142.
72 Class Action, 612 F. Supp. at 943.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 944. The Fifth Amendment provides: "[n]o person shall ... be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. .. ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The court reasoned that "[t]he material witness is deprived of liberty without an
opportunity to consult with counsel or to have his interests represented because he
is not charged with a crime. Consequently, individuals that are incarcerated
without being charged with criminal activity are afforded less protection than
individuals charged with criminal activity." ClassAction, 612 F. Supp. at 945.
75 Class Action, 612 F. Supp. at 945.
[T]his Court firmly believes that the appointment of counsel to represent
these individuals will ensure that any decision to continue their
incarceration is wellreasoned and based upon full consideration of all
relevant evidence. In addition, appointment of counsel will help ensure
that a material witness receives all of his rights... and.., that any
conditions imposed upon the release of the individual will be only as
stringent as is required to secure his presence as a witness at trial. Lastly,
counsel ... can ensure that the material witness receives all rights
available to him... regarding the deposition of individuals prior to trial.
Id.
76 See Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 943 (9th Cir. 1971).
77 Id.
78 Id.
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court.7 9 In addition, if testimony may be secured through
deposition, then the witness should not be detained. Each of
these elements of section 3144 merit further examination.
A.

MaterialityRequirement of Section 3144

Bacon v. United States8 ° is an important decision construing
material witness law. Bacon was decided under the former
material witness statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3149, and its pre-1972
companion, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(b).81 Thus,
the court considered the validity of a material witness arrest
without the benefit of any clear statutory authority to do so.
The Bacon court determined that a material witness arrest
warrant should be held to the same standards of probable cause
as any arrest warrant.8 2 The probable cause necessary in the
material witness context necessarily differs, however, from
probable cause for a standard arrest warrant.
The court
determined first, that the testimony of the witness must be
"material" and second, that it must be impracticable to secure
the witness's presence by subpoena.8 3 The court also decided
that the mere assertion by the government that the testimony of
the witness is material was sufficient because of the special
secrecy concerns of grand jury investigations. Therefore, the
84
court refused to require a detailed factual basis for materiality.
The defendant in United States v. Oliver8 5 faced a similar
situation. He had been arrested as a material witness to appear
before a grand jury based upon the bare assertion by the
government attorney that his testimony was material.8 6 Oliver
challenged his arrest as a material witness, citing lack of
probable cause for issuance of the warrant, namely, that the
79 MICHAEL H.

GRAHAM, WITNESS INTIMIDATION:

THE LAW'S RESPONSE 57

(1985). Although the judicial officer must inquire into the materiality of the witness
and his potential unavailability at trial, the prosecutor's affidavit is generally held
to be prima facie proof.
80 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971).
81 See id. at 937-38.
82 Id. at 942.
83 Id. at 943.
84 Id. This might be inconsistent with Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S.
480, 486 (1958), which states that the reviewing magistrate cannot rely on the
conclusions of the government, but rather, must have a factual basis for probable
cause determinations.
85 683 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1982).
86 Id. at 226.
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materiality requirement was not satisfied.8 7 The court held that
a materiality representation by a "responsible official" was
adequate,8 8 but expressly limited its holding to witnesses
material to the functions of a grand jury.8 9
In Arnsberg v. United States,90 the plaintiff sued the
government to recover damages for the execution of an invalid
material witness arrest warrant against him. 91 A magistrate
had issued a warrant calling for Arnsberg's arrest as a material
witness, but the warrant was facially invalid. 92 Arnsberg
claimed that his subsequent arrest pursuant to the invalid
warrant constituted false imprisonment and an unreasonable
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 93 Arnsberg argued that
he had not been personally served with a subpoena and,
therefore, had no obligation to appear before the grand jury.
94
Consequently, he could not be arrested for failing to appear.
The government countered that the material witness arrest
warrant was justified because agents were unable to serve
Arnsberg with the subpoena. 95 The court noted, however, that
even under the government's theory, the warrant was invalid
because the agents' difficulties in attempting to serve Arnsberg
did not establish probable cause for believing that it would be
87 Id. at 231.
Oliver... contends that in order to satisfy the materiality requirement, we
should require that a factual basis be set forth in the materials submitted
with the issuing judicial officer. Representation by an Assistant United
States Attorney that the witness is material is insufficient in Oliver's
mind. He argues that the present requirement permits a much lower
standard than that required for the issuance of a standard arrest warrant.
Id.
88 Id. "We believe requiring a materiality representation by a responsible
official of the United States Attorney's Office strikes a proper and adequate balance
between protecting the secrecy of the grand jury's investigation and subjecting an
individual to an unjustified arrest." Id.
89 Id. "We too limit our holding to witnesses material to the functions of a grand
jury. We express no view on the propriety of extending this rule to witnesses
material to a trial, where the special concerns of the grand jury are not present." Id.
90 757 F.2d 971 (9th Cir. 1984).
91 Id. at 975.
92 Id. The magistrate found the elements necessary for a material witness
arrest warrant satisfied, but the warrant itself stated that the arrest was for
"Failure to Appear before the Federal Grand Jury." The statute allegedly violated
by Arnsberg was listed as "Title 18, Section 3149"-the material witness arrest
statute. Id. at 975.
93 Id. at 975-76.
94 Id. at 976.
95 Id.

2002]

MATERIAL WITNESS DETENTION

impracticable to secure his presence by subpoena. 96 After
weighing the competing interests, the court concluded that the
warrant was invalid regardless of whose version of the arrest
was accepted. 97 The court noted, however, that this did not
make execution of the warrant a tortious act for which the
government was liable. 9 The court also held that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity precluded recovery on Arnsberg's Fourth
Amendment claim. 99
B.

ImpracticabilityRequirement of Section 3144

The second element of probable cause requires the
impracticability of securing the witness's presence by subpoena.
A sufficient showing of probable unavailability at trial has been
based on circumstances such as a witness moving without
leaving a forwarding address, a witness not appearing when
requested or subpoenaed to appear, or the inability to serve a
subpoena upon a witness. 10 0
In one of the oldest material witness cases, Barry v. United
States ex rel. Cunningham,1°1 petitioner Cunningham filed a writ
of habeas corpus directed to the Sergeant at Arms of the United
States Senate, David S. Barry, after he was arrested and
detained for refusing to answer a Senate committee's questions
regarding campaign donations. 10 2 The issue was whether the
Senate had the authority to force Cunningham to testify as a
witness by means of an arrest warrant. 10 3 The Court noted that
"as a necessary prerequisite to the issue of a warrant of arrest, a
subpoena first should have been issued, served, and
disobeyed."' 0 4 The Court, however, in upholding Cunningham's
detention, indicated that "a court has power in the exercise of a
sound discretion to issue a warrant of arrest without a previous
subpoena when there is good reason to believe that otherwise the
u0 5
witness will not be forthcoming.'
96 Id.
97 Id. at 976-77.
98 Id. at 979-80.

99 Id. at 980.
100 GRAHAM, supra note 79, at 57.
101279 U.S. 597 (1929).
102 Id. at 610-11.
103 Id. at 613.
104 Id. at 616.
105 Id. at 616-17.
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In United States v. Anfield, 106 a witness was arrested shortly
before the defendant's criminal trial, even though he had already
10 7
appeared before a grand jury in compliance with a subpoena.
When his trial testimony differed substantially from his grand
jury testimony, he was indicted for perjury. 0 8 Anfield argued
that he was a putative defendant at the time he testified at the
trial as a material witness and, therefore, should have received
Miranda warnings. 10 9 The court disagreed, noting Anfield's
incarceration as a material witness did not entitle him to
Miranda warnings, 11 0 and holding that the use of his trial
1 11
testimony in his subsequent perjury prosecution was proper.
112
Similarly, the petitioner in United States v. Feingold
argued that the government could not issue a material witness
113
arrest warrant until he had actually disobeyed a subpoena.
The court held that the requirement of impracticability was met
because there had been several unsuccessful attempts to serve
Feingold with a subpoena. 114 Because his testimony was needed
for a trial, rather than a grand jury proceeding, it was urgent to
secure his appearance while the trial was in progress. 115 Thus,
his arrest was deemed proper.
In United States v. McVeigh, 116 co-defendant Nichols heard
his name broadcast over the media in connection with the
Oklahoma City bombing in April 1995.117 He went to the police
106 539 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1976).
107
108

Id. at 676.
Id.

109 Id. at 676-77; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-79 (1966)
(discussing constitutionally mandated warnings).
110 Anfield, 539 F.2d at 677; see also United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564,
578-80 (1976) (holding that Grand Jury witnesses are not entitled to Miranda
warnings).
111 Anfield, 539 F.2d at 677.

416 F. Supp. 627 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
Id. at 628.
114 Id. at 629.
115Id. at 628-29. The court stated:
We are not here dealing with a witness before a grand jury... where
disregard of a subpoena would simply mean a continuation of the grand
jury's deliberations until an appropriate warrant might be served and
executed .... Once commenced, the trial would continue on consecutive
days, and Feingold's testimony would be needed before the Government
rested its case.
Id. (citation omitted).
116 940 F. Supp. 1541 (D. Colo. 1996).
117 Id. at 1547.
112
113
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station near his home to ask why his name was being associated
with the bombing investigation." 8 A material witness arrest
warrant was obtained while he was being interviewed by FBI
Agents. 1 9 The affidavit for the warrant was drafted using a
material witness warrant that had been issued the previous day
for a different investigation. 20 The drafter mistakenly included
the language from the prior warrant on the face of the Nichols
warrant, indicating that he "has attempted to leave the
jurisdiction of the United States, and it may become
impracticable to secure his presence by subpoena."' 2 ' After
discovering the mistakes in the affidavit, the judge signed a
revised warrant. The judge was not told that Nichols was at the
police station when the application for the warrant was
presented, and the agents interviewing Nichols were not told
when the warrant was obtained because of a "command decision
to keep the interview going, recognizing that upon his arrest
Terry Nichols might stop talking."1 22 Several hours into the
interview, Nichols was formally arrested on the material witness
23
warrant and the interview ended.
Nichols' attorney moved to quash the material witness
warrant, arguing that there was a lack of probable cause because
impracticality had not been demonstrated, and therefore, any
statements made by Nichols following his arrest as a material
witness should be suppressed. 124 Counsel pointed out that the
affidavit was incorrect because Nichols had voluntarily met with
authorities, and even consented to searches of his home and
vehicle. 25 The court denied the motion, finding the agents'
118

Id.

119 Id. at 1549.

Id.
Id. The affidavit contained other mistakes, such as bearing the caption
"United States v. Terry Lynn Nichols," even though no criminal charges had yet
been initiated by the government, and the affidavit was entitled "Warrant for
Arrest" without indicating it was for the arrest of a material witness. Id.
122 Id. at 1550.
123 Id. During the time Nichols was in the police station, the news media
broadcast that he was in custody in Kansas. Id. The Kansas Federal Public
Defender, David Phillips, began trying to locate Nichols, to see if he needed an
attorney. Id. He called the police station where Nichols was being interviewed and
someone took the message "without comment." Id. "No one told Mr. Nichols about
that offer for legal assistance, and he did not request counsel while he was at the...
police station ..." Id.
124 Id. at 1562.
125 Id. at 1551-52.
120
121

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.76:483

affidavit met the government's burden of demonstrating
probable cause. 126
The court found that the inaccurate
statement on the face of the warrant was not in the supporting
affidavit and therefore was "not a part of the showing of probable
cause. '127 Nichols appealed, but the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held the appeal moot since a new arrest warrant
against Nichols had been filed based upon a criminal complaint,
and the material arrest warrant had been dismissed by the
district court. 128
Nichols' detention continued, and he was
ultimately charged and convicted as a co-conspirator in the
Oklahoma City bombing. 129
C.

The DepositionAlternative of Section 3144

No material witness may be detained if his testimony can be
secured by deposition, provided the deposition would be a
sufficient alternative to the witness's live testimony and that
"further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of
justice.' 130 The release of a material witness may be delayed for
a reasonable time until the witness's deposition can be taken
pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 13 1 It has
been observed, however, that resort to this procedure by a
material witness, who is generally reluctant to testify, is
understandably rare. 132
The deposition must be admissible despite any objections by
the government or the accused. 133 Such objections are typically
134
based upon the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
126 Id. at 1562. The agent asserted, in the supporting affidavit, "Terry Nichols'
renunciation of his U.S. citizenship and his association with Tim McVeigh, a person
involved in such a heinous crime, indicates that his testimony cannot be secured
through the issuance of a subpoena." Id.
127

Id.

United States v. Nichols, 77 F.3d 1277, 1279 (10th Cir. 1996).
United States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255, 1260 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding
Nichols guilty of eight counts of involuntary manslaughter and of conspiring to use
a weapon of mass destruction). Nichols was sentenced to life imprisonment on the
conspiracy count and six years on each manslaughter count. His convictions were
affirmed on appeal. Id.
130 Aguilar-Ayala v. Ruiz, 973 F.2d 411, 413 (5th Cir. 1992); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 3144 (2000).
131 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000).
132 8 B.J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 46.11 (1978).
128
129

133

Id.

134 See

U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), the
Court described the application that the Confrontation Clause contemplates:
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or the Federal Rules of Evidence. 135 Defendants have also
objected to the admission of witness depositions under the Sixth
136
Amendment right to the compulsory process of witnesses.
A material witness can file a written motion with the district
court pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
137
Procedure, requesting that he be released and deposed.
Together, Rule 15 and the federal material witness statute
provide a strategy whereby a witness can seek his own release
from confinement. 38 Upon filing a "written motion" to be
deposed, the witness must show that his "testimony can
adequately be secured by deposition" and "further detention is
not necessary to prevent a failure of justice."1 39 Generally,
judicial applications of Rule 15 place the burden of making the
[A] personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which
the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and

sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to
face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his
demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony
whether he is worthy of belief.
Id. at 63-64 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895)).
135See Aguilar-Ayala, 973 F.2d at 413. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
15(e) provides that a deposition "may be used as substantive evidence if the witness
is unavailable, as unavailability is defined in Rule 804(a) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, or the witness gives testimony at the trial or hearing inconsistent with
that witness' deposition." FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(e). Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1)
allows a deposition into evidence over a hearsay objection if the witness is
"unavailable" as defined in Rule 804(a). FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
136 Washington v.Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1966), defined the right to compulsory
process:
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their
attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense,
the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the
prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an
accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the
purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own
witnesses to establish a defense.
Id. at 19 (1966); see also United States v. Huang, 827 F. Supp. 945, 950-51
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (using witnesses' depositions in lieu of live testimony would violate
defendants' right to compulsory process).
137 See Aguilar-Ayala, 973 F.2d at 413. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
15(a) provides, in part, "If a witness is detained pursuant to section 3144 of title 18,
United States Code, the court on written motion of the witness and upon notice to
the parties may direct that the witness' deposition be taken. After the deposition
has been subscribed the court may discharge the witness." Id. (citing FED. R. CRIM.
P. 15(a)).
138See id. (noting that alien witnesses petitioned for writ of mandamus
requesting district court schedule their videotaped depositions).
139Aguilar-Ayala, 973 F.2d at 413 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3144).
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written request for a deposition on the material witness.140
Understandably, the witness who is represented by counsel
would be able to meet these requirements much more readily
than an unrepresented witness. Thereafter, the district court
must order the deposition and release of the witness. 14 1 Denial
of the motion is reserved to "those instances in which the
deposition would not serve as an adequate substitute for the
42
witness' live testimony."
The government has the burden of demonstrating a material
witness's unavailability in order to admit the deposition
testimony. 143 While numerous convictions have been reversed
due to the government's failure to establish that a witness was
truly unavailable for trial,144 some federal courts have affirmed
criminal convictions despite the apparent availability of the
witness for trial. 145 Further, several courts have found that a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was
violated where the government failed to take steps to secure the
attendance of foreign material witnesses at trial and relied
instead on depositions taken pursuant to Rule 15.146 These
140 See id.; United States v. Nai Fook Li, 949 F. Supp. 42, 44 (D. Mass. 1996);
Huang, 827 F. Supp. at 948.
141 Aguilar-Ayala, 973 F.2d at 413 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3144).
142 Id.; see United States v. Lopez-Cervantes, 918 F.2d 111, 112 (10th Cir. 1990)
(finding depositions taken of alien material witnesses improper, since neither the
government nor the witnesses requested the depositions, and both parties objected).
143 See United States v. Martinez-Perez, 916 F.2d 1020, 1023 (5th Cir. 1990)
(citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980)); see also United States v. EufracioTorres, 890 F.2d 266, 270 (10th Cir. 1989) (noting the district court permitted
deposition of alien witnesses over defense objection and ordered their release upon
their promise to return for trial; witnesses deemed unavailable and deposition
testimony admitted over defendant's Sixth Amendment objection, when witnesses
failed to return for trial).
144 See Aguilar-Ayala, 973 F.2d at 417-18; see also United States v. FuentesGalindo, 929 F.2d 1507, 1510-11 (10th Cir. 1991); Lopez-Cervantes, 918 F.2d at
115-115; Martinez-Perez, 916 F.2d at 1024-26; United States v. Guadian-Salazar,
824 F.2d 344, 347-48 (5th Cir. 1987).
145 See United States v. Rivera, 859 F.2d 1204, 1207 (4th Cir. 1988) (indicating
alien-witnesses were "unavailable," allowing the use of their depositions,
notwithstanding that the government approved the deposition procedure, released
the witnesses, and did not attempt to obtain their appearance at trial); see also
United States v. Terrazas-Montano, 747 F.2d 467, 468-69 (8th Cir. 1984)
(indicating alien-witnesses who had been deposed were "unavailable" even though
the government deported them, knew the witnesses would not return, and did not
attempt to obtain their return for trial).
146 See Guadian-Salazar,824 F.2d at 347 (noting government made inadequate
attempts to secure return of witnesses from Mexico to United States for trial);
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concerns are mitigated, however, where the defendant has the
147
opportunity to cross-examine the material witness under oath.
III. PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS
A.

Material Witnesses and the FourthAmendment

The
protects
houses,
seizure"

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
papers and effects, against unreasonable search and
and mandates that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation." 148 The
Supreme Court, in
interpreting the prohibition against

unreasonable seizures, has held that an individual "may not be
detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective
grounds for doing so."149
A "temporary" seizure of an individual may be justified
under Terry v. Ohio' 50 for investigative purposes. The Supreme
Court, however, requires the detention be "reasonably related in

scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place."''1 1 Furthermore, "[tihe scope of the detention must
be carefully tailored to its underlying justification."1 52 This
narrowed focus of any detention is significant as it applies to
warrants.

The Fourth Amendment mandates that issuance of a
warrant requires a determination of probable cause by a "neutral
and detached magistrate."15 3

Probable cause exists when the

United States v. Mann, 590 F.2d 361, 367 (1st Cir. 1978) (admission of a deposition
of a witness permitted by the government to leave the United States violated the
Confrontation Clause); see also Phillips v. Wyrick, 558 F.2d 489, 493 (8th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Lynch, 499 F.2d 1011, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v.
Simuel, 439 F.2d 687, 689 (4th Cir. 1971). But see United States v. Allie, 978 F.2d
1401, 1402-04 (5th Cir. 1992) (concluding alien witnesses were "unavailable" for
Confrontation Clause purposes even though the government allowed them to leave
the country).
147See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724 (1968); Eufracio-Torres, 890 F.2d at
270; United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944, 950 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Seijo,
595 F.2d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 1979); Phillips,558 F.2d at 493.
14sU.S. CONST. amend. IV.
149 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983).
150 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1967).
151Id. at 20.
152

Royer, 460 U.S. at 500.

153Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).

The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous
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facts and circumstances described in the affidavit indicate a fair
probability that evidence of a crime will be found on the
premises of the proposed search' 54 or, in the case of a material
witness, when it is determined that the individual's testimony is
material and that it is "impracticable to secure [their] presence
by subpoena." 15 5 "Sufficient information must be presented to
the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause;
his [or her] action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare
156
conclusions of others."
The validity of a warrant depends "upon the sufficiency of
what is found within the four corners of the underlying
affidavit.' 5 7 The facts in the affidavit must establish a sufficient
nexus between the witness and the testimony sought by the
government. 5 8 When examining warrant requests, courts apply
a "totality of the circumstances approach" to determine whether
59
there is probable cause to justify the issuance of the warrant.
Affidavits that do not set forth a "substantial basis" to conclude
an individual is a material witness are rejected as presenting a
lack of probable cause, and it is unreasonable for officers to rely
60
upon such warrants.
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual
inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection
consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.

Id.
154 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); see also United States v.
Loggins, 777 F.2d 336, 338 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Algie, 721 F.2d 1039,
1041 (6th Cir. 1983).
155 See Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 943 (9th Cir. 1971).
156 Gates, 462 U.S. at 239. Generally, a magistrate's determination of probable
cause is entitled to great deference. Id. at 234, 239. Yet, "the [district] court
must... insist that the magistrate perform his 'neutral and detached' function and
not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police." Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108,
111 (1964). As such, "[dieference to the magistrate ... is not boundless." United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984).
157 United States v. Martinez, 588 F.2d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1978).
158 See United States v. Freeman, 685 F.2d 942, 949 (5th Cir. 1982) (requiring
connection between the place to be searched and the evidence sought); see also
United States v. Lockett, 674 F.2d 843, 846 (11th Cir. 1982) (asserting that there
"must be a 'substantial basis' to conclude that the instrumentalities of the crime will
be discovered on the searched premises").
159 Gates, 462 U.S. at 230.
160 Federal courts have invalidated warrants for lack of probable cause when
the underlying affidavits did not present evidence establishing the requisite nexus
between, for instance, a place to be searched and items to be seized. See United
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Material Witness Arrest Without a Warrant

The issue of whether a material witness can be arrested
under federal law without a warrant, or prior to the subsequent
issuance of a warrant, is a contentious one. One court observed,
"No case has been found approving the seizure and detention of a
witness absent a warrant. Police have less authority to detain
those who have witnessed a crime than to detain those suspected
161
of committing a crime under the Fourth Amendment."
Historically, the Supreme Court has approved a police
officer's arrest without a warrant of an individual suspected of
16 2
committing a crime if there is probable cause for the arrest.
Probable cause is determined by the totality of the
circumstances. 163 The Court defined probable cause to search as
"a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place." 164 Furthermore, "[p]robable cause
exists where 'the facts and circumstances within their [the
officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an
16 5
offense has been or is being committed.'

States v. Gardner, 537 F.2d 861, 862 (6th Cir. 1976). In United States v. Savoca, 761
F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1985), FBI agents obtained a search warrant for the defendants'
hotel room. The affidavit indicated that the agents had seen the defendants in the
hotel room and knew that they had outstanding federal arrest warrants for bank
robberies on unspecified dates. In invalidating the search warrant for lack of
probable cause, the Sixth Circuit recognized the well-established legal principle
"that the existence of probable cause to arrest will not necessarily establish
probable cause to search." Id. at 297 (citing United States v. Hatcher, 473 F.2d 321
(6th Cir. 1973)).
161 Orozco v. County of Yolo, 814 F. Supp. 885, 893 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
162 See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959) (noting that the
necessary inquiry was not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time
to get one, but whether there was probable cause for the arrest); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925) ("The usual rule is that a police officer may arrest
without warrant one believed by the officer upon reasonable cause to have been
guilty of a felony .. ");
see also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 (1975) (stating
that the Supreme Court "has never invalidated an arrest supported by probable
cause solely because the officers failed to secure a warrant"); Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23, 24 (1963) (upholding warrantless arrest based upon probable cause); Abel
v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 226-230 (1960) (upholding warrantless
administrative arrest); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310 (1959) (upholding
warrantless arrest).
163 Gates, 462 U.S. at 230.
164 Id. at 238.
165 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
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Further, the Supreme
Court has recognized the
constitutional validity of statutorily authorized searches. 16 6 In
United States v. Watson, 167 the defendant was arrested in a
public area. The arresting officer, a postal inspector, had
probable cause to believe Watson possessed stolen mail, which
was a federal felony. 168 The inspector had statutory authority to
make the arrest under a postal regulation. 16 9 The Supreme
Court found that the statutory authorization to make a
warrantless arrest based upon probable cause did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. 170 The Court emphasized that it would not
transform the judicial preference for warrants into a
constitutional requirement. 17'
Similarly, Congress does not
require proof of exigent circumstances in delegating arrest
powers to members of the FBI, and clearly allows agents to make
172
warrantless arrests.
At common law, a peace officer was permitted to arrest
without a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his
presence, as well as for a felony not committed in his presence, if
173
there were reasonable grounds for making the arrest.
166 An exception to this rule, however, is that a warrant is required to arrest a
person in his or her home. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). In Payton,
the Supreme Court held that, in the absence of exigent circumstances, police may
not enter a criminal suspect's home without a warrant:
The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of
settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when
bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's
home-a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional terms:
"The right of the people to be secure in their... houses ...shall not be
violated."
Id. at 589. This language unequivocally establishes that "[alt the very core [of the
Fourth Amendment] stands the rights of a man to retreat into his own home and
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). In terms that apply equally to seizures of property
and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance
to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be
crossed without a warrant. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 589-90.
167 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
168 Id. at 414-15.
169 Id. at 415.
170 Id. at 424.
171 Id. at 423-24.
172 See 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (2000) (requiring only reasonable grounds to believe a
person "has committed or is committing" a felony in order to make an arrest without
a warrant).
173Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 504 (1885) ("The rule of the common law, that
a peace officer or a private citizen may arrest a felon without a warrant, has been
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The court in Rohan v. Sawin 174 noted:
It has been sometimes contended, that an arrest of this
character, without a warrant, was a violation of the great
fundamental principles of our national and state constitutions,
forbidding unreasonable searches and arrests, except by
warrant founded upon a complaint made under oath. Those
provisions doubtless had another and different purpose, being
in restraint of general warrants to make searches, and
requiring warrants to issue only upon a complaint made under
oath. They do not conflict with the authority of constables or
other peace-officers, or private persons under proper
limitations, to arrest without warrant those who have
The public safety, and the due
committed felonies.
apprehension of criminals, charged with heinous offences,
imperiously require that such175arrests should be made without
warrant by officers of the law.
The court in Bacon v. United States176 refused to decide
"whether, if ever, a material witness may be arrested and
detained with probable cause but without a warrant." Various
states have recognized the validity of a warrantless arrest of a
One Oregon court, however, has
Material witness. 177
generally held by the courts of the several States to be in force in cases of felony
punishable by the civil tribunals."); see also Watson, 423 U.S. at 414-24 (holding
that the arrest of respondent, having been based on probable cause and made by
postal officers acting in strict compliance with the governing statute and
regulations, did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
174 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 281 (1850).
175 Id. at 284-85.
176 449 F.2d 933, 943 (7th Cir. 1971).
177 See White v. Gerbitz, 892 F.2d 457 (6th Cir. 1989) (upholding warrantless
arrest and detention of homeless man as material witness, supported by probable
cause, under Tennessee law). In State v. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa
2002), the court stated:
We prefer an officer to obtain an arrest warrant from a magistrate by
demonstrating his reasons for believing an individual to be a material
witness reasonably likely to be unavailable for trial before arresting an
individual as a material witness. However, we recognize exigent
circumstances may exist in certain cases, such as where an officer is in hot
pursuit of a witness and the warrant requirement would unreasonably
frustrate the officer's efforts to locate the witness. If we required an arrest
warrant in every case, some witnesses may never be located.
Id. at 242 (citation omitted). Similarly, in State v. Hand, 242 A.2d 888 (N.J. 1968),
the New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
Under the common law of New Jersey,... a peace officer may arrest
without a warrant when he has a reasonable basis or probable cause to
believe a person is necessary and material witness to a crime punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year and that person might be
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disapproved of such arrests. 178
This is an issue that has generated little litigation. Until
recently, material witness arrests were relatively rare, at least
compared to criminal arrest. Additionally, such arrests were of
short duration, and violations were not subject to any remedy, so
there was little point to litigation. Furthermore, common sense
dictates that most courts would find that, in some situations,
police officers could seize and detain material witnesses without
a writ. Assume, for example, an officer who knows a witness has
critical information and the witness is about to flee the
jurisdiction. Must the officer stand idly by and watch the
witness depart? Seizing the witness would be both prudent and
reasonable, and only unreasonable seizures are prohibited by the
179
Constitution.
C. Material Witness Detention Pursuantto the Common Law
Powers of the Court
"Courts which originate in the common law possess a
jurisdiction which must be regulated by their common law, until
18 0
some statute shall change their established principles .... "
Courts have considered whether there is a common law right
to arrest material witnesses. In United States v. Bacon, the
Ninth Circuit noted that most jurisdictions faced with this issue
have rejected the existence of this right.' 8 '
One court
determined, "If such a right does exist, however, the Court is
certain that it would be subject to the same requirements as the
statutory right to arrest a material witness-there must be some
showing that the witness will not cooperate with law
enforcement efforts to obtain her testimony." 8 2 Clearly, there
could hardly be greater power to arrest without a statute than
unavailable for service of a subpoena ....It is, in the opinion of this court,
not sufficient for an arrest without a warrant that a person might be a
witness to material aspects of a crime. The officer should reasonably
believe that the alleged witness can give testimony which is essential to
the State.
Id. at 895.
178 See State v. McKendall, 584 P.2d 316, 319 (Or. 1978) (holding material
witness orders must originate with a magistrate or judge under Oregon law),
overruled on othergrounds by State v. Lopez, 936 P.2d 386, 388 (Or. 1997).
179 U.S. CONST. amend IV; see also supra Part III.A.
180 Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93 (1807).
181 United States v. Bacon, 449 F.2d 933, 939 (1971).
182 Perkins v. Click, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1183 n.6 (D.N.M.
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with one, for this would render the statute meaningless. The
existence of a common law power would only be significant, for
instance, if any potential material witness was beyond the scope
183
of the material witness statute.
Despite this, most courts have expressly rejected a common
84
law power to detain persons as material witnesses.
Specifically, in the federal system, courts have limited
jurisdiction and have only the powers granted by Congress. 185 A
gap in the court's power clearly exists and it is the responsibility
of Congress to fill it.
D. Material Witnesses and GrandJury Proceedings
"[Ilt is clearly recognized that the giving of testimony and
the attendance upon court or grand jury in order to testify are
public duties which every person within the jurisdiction of the
Government is bound to perform upon being properly
18 6
summoned...."
Courts have debated whether an individual can be detained
as a material witness in order to appear and testify before a
grand jury when no pending criminal charges are filed against
the target of the investigation. In Bacon v. United States, the
Ninth Circuit determined that a witness could be detained for
the purpose of testifying before a grand jury. 187 In Bacon, a
complaint was sworn before the district judge which stated that
the witness "had personal knowledge of matters material to a
grand jury investigation and that a subpoena would be
ineffective in securing her presence." 8 8 Based on the complaint,

183An example might be found in United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d
55 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The defendant was seized as a material witness so that he
might testify before a grand jury, even though no charges were pending against
anyone. Id. at 58. The federal material witness statute does not explicitly authorize
seizure and detention for grand jury testimony. Id. A common law power would fill
this particular niche, at least if the common law power was applicable to grand jury
proceedings. See Bacon, 449 F.2d at 939 (noting that although most courts do not
consider a common law right to arrest and detain witnesses, some do, and these

courts could apply this right to grand jury proceedings); Crosby v. Potts, 69 S.E.
582, 584 (Ga. Ct. App. 1910) (finding common law right to detain witnesses in
context of a criminal trial).
184 See Bacon, 499 F.2d at 939.
185 See Bollman, 8 U.S. at 93.

186Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919).
187 Bacon, 449 F.2d at 933.
188 Id. at 934.
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the court issued an order to the United States Marshal to arrest
5 9
Bacon and transport her in custody until she posted bail.
Bacon filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, challenging her
detention as a material witness, which was denied by the district
court. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and quashed the
arrest warrant on a finding that there was no showing of
probable cause to support the conclusion that Bacon could not be
brought before the grand jury with a subpoena. 190
The Bacon decision is important because of the context in
which the material witness arrest warrant was issued. The
court held, "In the case of a grand jury proceeding, we think that
a mere statement by a responsible official, such as the United
States Attorney, is sufficient to satisfy [the materiality
requirement of the material witness statute]."191 The court
reasoned:
This is because of the special function of the grand jury; it has
exceedingly broad powers of investigation, and its proceedings
are secret. We have also held that where a showing is being
made in support of a proposed grant of immunity to a grand
jury witness, the mere assertion by the United States Attorney
that the investigation involves the applicable statute is enough.
These principles, we think, are applicable here. We express no
opinion as to what showing as to materiality must be made in
192
the case of a witness who is to testify at a trial.
Similarly, in United States v. Oliver, the defendant was
arrested as a grand jury material witness based merely upon the
"bare assertion" of a Government attorney that his testimony
was material. 193 Oliver argued that in order to satisfy the
materiality requirement and establish probable cause to arrest a
material witness, the court should require "that a factual basis
be set forth in the materials submitted with the issuing judicial
officer." 194 The court rejected Oliver's argument, stating that a
grand jury has "unique powers and functions" and requires
189 Id. at 934-35.
190Id. at 945.
191 Id.
192 Id.

at 943.
(citations omitted).
193United States v. Oliver, 683 F.2d 224, 231 (7th Cir. 1982).
194 Id. Oliver contended that a factual basis must be established in the
materials submitted to the issuing judicial officer in order to satisfy the materiality
requirement and that a representation by an Assistant United States Attorney that
the witness is material is insufficient. He maintained that to rule otherwise would
permit a lower standard than that required for a standard arrest warrant. Id.
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secrecy to perform its investigatory processes; such secrecy could
be seriously jeopardized if the factual basis must be articulated
each time a material witness warrant is sought.'95 Thus, the
court held that a materiality representation by a responsible
official was adequate, 196 but expressly limited its holding to
197
witnesses material to the functions of a grand jury.
In United States v. Awadallah, the district court rejected the
Government's assertions that material witnesses can be detained
for the sole purpose of testifying before a grand jury conducting
an investigation. 198 In so doing, the court expressly rejected
Bacon, finding its language regarding material witnesses and
grand juries to be "dicta."' 99 The court noted that grand juries
operate in secret, and courts are prohibited from inquiring into
their proceedings under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. 20 0 The court further distinguished its holding from
Bacon, noting that section 3142 of the Bail Reform Act applies to
proceedings "pending trial."20 1 Moreover, 18 U.S.C. § 3144
requires an affidavit filed by a "party," not a witness, and refers
to the adversarial process between a prosecutor and a
defendant. 20 2 The court was troubled by the fact that there are
no "parties" to a grand jury proceeding, and that no criminal
charges are pending when a grand jury is convened to
investigate a matter. 20 3 Furthermore, the Bail Reform Act
contemplates release or detention pending trial, sentence, or
appeal, and does not mention "witnesses" per se. 204 The court
emphasized that a grand jury has subpoena power, which is
195

Id.

196 Id.

"We believe requiring a materiality representation by a responsible

official of the United States Attorney's Office strikes a proper and adequate balance
between protecting the secrecy of the grand jury's investigation and subjecting an
individual to an unjustified arrest." Id.
197 Id. "[W]e too limit our holding to witnesses material to the functions of a
grand jury. We express no view on the propriety of extending this rule to witnesses
material to a trial, where the special concerns of the grand jury are not present." Id.
198 United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 63 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
199 Id. at 72.
200 Id. at 63 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)).
201 Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a) (2000) ("Upon the appearance before a judicial
officer of a person charged with an offense, the judicial officer shall issue an order
that, pending trial, the person be [released or detained].").
202 Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 62.
203 Id. at 62-63.
204 Id. at 66; see 18 U.S.C. § 3141 (2000) (discussing release and detention
authority generally).
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much less intrusive than requiring the detention of a material
205
witness for the purpose of testifying.
The court concluded that the federal material witness
statute does not authorize the detention of material witnesses
for a grand jury investigation. 20 6 The decision reflected concern
that the Government, by detaining a witness for investigatory
purposes only, was over-reaching and using the material witness
statute for a purpose for which it was not intended. 207 "The only
legitimate reason to detain a grand jury witness is to aid in 'an ex
parte investigation to determine whether a crime has been
committed and whether criminal proceedings should be
instituted against any person.' "208 Because Awadallah was
detained under the material witness statute, an action the court
refused to sanction, his grand jury testimony was suppressed as
the product of an unlawful seizure, and perjury charges
stemming from a conflict in his grand jury testimony were
209
dismissed.
Another federal judge in the same district found the
reasoning and conclusion of Awadallah to be faulty and refused
to follow it. In re the Application of the United States for a
Material Witness Warrant ("Application")210 involved an
individual detained as a material witness in order to ensure his
appearance before a grand jury investigating the September
11th terrorist attacks. The witness moved to quash the material
witness warrant, and, relying on United States v. Awadallah,
argued that the material witness statute does not apply to grand
jury proceedings and that the Government violated his Fifth
Amendment rights when it transported him from another
jurisdiction to New York to testify. He further asserted that the
Government should be compelled to depose him immediately,
rather than bring him to New York to appear before the grand

205 Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 74 (stating that Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 17, which governs the subpoena power in criminal proceedings, also
applies to grand jury investigations).
206 Id. at 76.
207 Id. at 77 (suggesting that the imprisonment of a material witness solely for
the grand jury investigation raises serious constitutional questions under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
208 Id. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-44 (1974)).
209 Id. at 82.
210 213 F. Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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jury.

211

The court primarily focused on the issue of whether the
material witness statute applies to grand jury proceedings.
Noting that Awadallah dismissed the Bacon decision as dicta,
the court examined the reasoning used by the Bacon court in
reaching the conclusion that the material witness law applied to
grand jury proceedings:
[B]ecause the enabling legislation authorized rules that covered
grand jury proceedings; because the grand jury is the body
authorized by the Constitution to initiate criminal proceedings;
because the Supreme Court had extended the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination to grand jury proceedings;
and because the rules themselves-including Rules 2 and 17showed the Supreme Court's intention to exercise the
Congressional grant of authority to the full; it appeared that
former Rule 46(b), and section 3149, both of which governed
bail for material witnesses, extended to grand jury proceedings
as well.

2 12

The Application court concluded that the Ninth Circuit's
determination in Bacon that the material witness statute
applied to grand jury witnesses was not dicta, but "instead [was]
necessary in order for the Court to reach the issue of
impracticability."

21 3

The Application court felt that the Awadallah rationalerejecting the application of the material witness statute to grand
jury proceedings because of the absence of the traditional
adversarial setting-was flawed for three reasons. First, the
court noted that three appellate courts-the Ninth Circuit in
Bacon,214 the First Circuit in In re De Jesus Berrios,215 and the
Seventh Circuit in Oliver 216 -have determined that it is the role
of a court to determine the materiality of a grand jury witness
211 Id. at 288. The witness, identified only as "John Doe," also argued that he
did not possess material information, and therefore, was not properly subpoenaed as

a grand jury witness. Id.
212 Id. at 291. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 2, cited by the court,
provides, "[tihese rules are intended to provide for the just determination of every
criminal proceeding." Id. at 290 (quoting Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 940
(9th Cir. 1971)). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17 governs issuance of
subpoenas both for trial and for grand jury appearances.
213 Id. at 291.
214 Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 943 (9th Cir. 1971).
215 706 F.2d 355, 358 (1st Cir. 1983).
21, United States v. Oliver, 683 F.2d 224, 231 (7th Cir. 1982).
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based solely on the representations of the government. 217
Second, the court pointed out that judges make such
determinations frequently "based on sealed submissions, when
deciding whether a subpoena calls for relevant information,
whether such information is privileged, and the like."218 Third,
the Application court noted that it is difficult to determine the
materiality of any witness and whether that witness, even trial
witnesses, should be detained or not, because frequently that
decision will have to be made before the trial begins and the
219
proofs are revealed.
In addition, the court disagreed with the finding in
Awadallah that there was no evidence of congressional intent to
220
apply the material witness statute to grand jury proceedings.
It noted that there is "direct evidence that a relevant
Congressional committee, and anyone who read its report, was
aware of Bacon's holding and also that the new statute [18
U.S.C. § 3144,] would apply to grand jury proceedings." 221 Thus,
Application concluded that Awadallah's reasoning was specious.
Having declined to follow Awadallah, the court rejected the
witness's requests that his deposition be taken pursuant to Rule
15 and that he be released. The court stated that even if he were
deposed, he could not be released as provided for in Rule 15
because he was a deportable alien. 222 The court, however,
refused to decide whether Rule 15 applied because the witness
did not meet the rule's requirements; the witness failed to move
for a deposition in the jurisdiction in which he had been
arrested, and he did not show the unavailability of a grand jury
to hear his testimony.
E.

Material Witness Detention Under The All Writs Act

The All Writs Act, originally enacted as part of the Judiciary
Act of 1789,223 provides, "The Supreme Court and all courts
established by act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or

217
218

Application, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 294.
Id.

220

Id. at 294-95.
Id. at 288.

221

Id. at 297 (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 28 n.88 (1983), reprinted in 1984

219

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3211).
222 Id. at 301.
223

Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 85.
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appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable
224
to the usages and principles of law."
The Act was created "because federal courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction having only those powers expressly granted
by Congress, and the statute provides these courts with the
procedural tools-the various historic common law writs225
necessary for them to exercise their limited jurisdiction."
"Unless appropriately confined by Congress, a federal court
may avail itself of all auxiliary writs as aids in the performance
of its duties, when the use of such historic aids is calculated in
its sound judgment to achieve the ends of justice entrusted to
it."226 The power conferred by the Act extends, under appropriate
circumstances, to persons who, though not parties to the original
action or engaged in wrongdoing, are in a position to frustrate
the implementation of a court order or the proper administration
227
of justice.
A federal court has the power under the All Writs Act to
issue an injunctive order in a case before the court's jurisdiction
has been established. When potential jurisdiction exists, a
federal court may issue orders preserving the status quo to
ensure that it will be in a position to exercise its jurisdiction once
228
it is demonstrated to exist.
Judge Scheindlin, in United States v. Awadallah, concluded
that "Congress has [not] granted the government the authority
to imprison an innocent person in order to guarantee that he will
229
testify before a grand jury" investigating criminal activity.
230
Other courts, however, have disagreed with Judge Scheindlin.
224

28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000).

United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 187 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted).
226 Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 273 (1942).
227 See Miss. Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 1, 6 (E.D. Mo.
1967), affd sub nom. Osbourne v. Miss. Valley Barge Line Co., 389 U.S. 579 (1968).
228 See FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 603-05 (1966).
229 United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
230 See In re De Jesus Berrios, 706 F.2d 355, 358 (1st Cir. 1983) (concluding
that an arrest to obtain material testimony which would not have been obtained
through a subpoena was proper); United States v. Oliver, 683 F.2d 224, 230-31 (7th
Cir. 1982) (noting that appellant conceded to the government's authority to issue a
material witness arrest warrant); Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 939 (9th
Cir. 1971) (holding the power of the government to arrest and detain material
witnesses is "fairly inferable from [federal statutes]"); In re The Application Of
United States for Material Witness Warrant, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287, 300 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (finding that the material witness statute as applied to grand jury witnesses
225
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Judge Scheindlin's conclusion was based on the argument that
the federal material witness statute does not expressly include
231
the words "grand jury" when referring to criminal proceedings.
Yet, because she failed to consider the possibility that the All
Writs Act would justify the seizure of a person as a witness in a
grand jury proceeding, it is questionable whether her view can
2 32
withstand judicial scrutiny.
"Courts... may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in
aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages
and principles of law."233 The Supreme Court held that the Act
justified an order from Judge Scheindlin's very court, the
Southern District of New York, directing that the local telephone
company provide the technical assistance necessary to enable the
installation of pen registers to investigate offenses which there
was probable cause to believe were being committed via
telephone. 234 More specifically, a court, consistent with the Act,
may impose duties and burdens upon third persons, 235 including
a requirement that a person present himself for testimony before
the grand jury; 236 however, there is no probable cause
237
requirement to submit to questioning before a grand jury.
It is clear the All Writs Act and the federal material witness
statute can be amalgamated to cover situations, such as grand
jury proceedings, not expressly encompassed by the federal
statute. This would be especially true if the requirements of the
material witness statute were otherwise followed, for example,
and detention for grand jury purposes, does not violate Fourth Amendment rights).
231 Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 58.
232 See id.
233 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000).
234 See United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172 (1977). A pen register
records the numbers dialed on a particular telephone. It does not record
conversations, and is installed in a remote location. Id. at 161 n.1.
235 The original order in New York Telephone made no reference to the All Writs
Act. See id. at 161-63. Nor does the arrest warrant issued in the Southern District
of New York in United States v. Awadallah reference the Act. The similarities in the
two cases are striking.
236 Obviously, a court can enforce a subpoena to appear before a grand jury with
the contempt power, which encompasses the power to incarcerate. See Blair v.
United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281-83 (1919) (noting that the offering of testimony to
a grand jury is a "public dut[y]" necessary to the "welfare of the public" and such
duty may be exercised only in "exceptional circumstances").

237 See United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991) (noting
probable cause is not needed since the purpose of a grand jury proceedings is to
establish probable cause). In egregious cases a subpoena might be quashed if
compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c).
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by appearing before a judicial officer and presenting an affidavit
establishing that the testimony of the witness is material to a
criminal investigation. 238 It would also be necessary to establish
that it was impracticable to secure the witness's presence by
The Government attempted to do each of the
subpoena.
foregoing in Awadallah.239 When read in conjunction with the
All Writs Act, it is clear that the material witness statute applies
to grand jury proceedings.
F.

Material Witnesses and the Exclusionary Rule

The exclusionary rule is a judicially created means of
deterring illegal searches and seizures by government and law
enforcement officials.2 40
The rule does not "proscribe the
introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or
against all persons," 24 1 but on the contrary, the rule is applied
only in contexts "where its remedial objectives are thought most
'242
efficaciously served.
The exclusionary rule provides that evidence seized during
an unlawful search may not constitute proof against the victim
of the search.2 43 The rule functions as a remedy created by the
courts which is "designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment
244
rights ... through its deterrent effect."
There are almost no cases involving the exclusionary rule
and material witnesses.
This is most likely because the
testimony of witnesses in criminal cases is typically offered
against someone other than the witness. Such other person,
usually a defendant in a criminal case, would not have available
238 The federal statute requires that the testimony be material to a criminal
proceeding. The word "investigation" would have to be substituted under the All
Writs Act. To do otherwise would imply that the All Writs Act is not applicable to
potential grand jury witnesses.
239 United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
240 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
241 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976).
242 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348; see also Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524
U.S. 357, 365 (1998) (stating that the exclusionary rule does not apply to parole
revocation proceedings); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-07 (1984)
(indicating application of the exclusionary rule must be determined by "weighing
the costs and benefits" of preventing the prosecutor's use of the evidence); United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule in
civil proceedings where the deterring effect on a police officer is sufficiently less
than the cost to society of enforcing the exclusion).
243 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S, 383, 398 (1914).
244 Calandra,414 U.S. at 348.
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any objection that would involve the exclusionary rule. 245

Another reason the exclusionary rule would be unlikely to
apply in cases involving material witnesses is the reluctance of
courts to exclude a witness's testimony. Thus, a witness who is
discovered by an illegal search is nonetheless allowed to
testify.246 This is also true of a witness discovered through a
statement elicited in violation of Miranda v. Arizona.247 The
incremental possibility of deterring other Miranda violations by
excluding the testimony is outweighed by society's need for
reliable testimony from witnesses. 248 Accordingly, given the
reluctance of the Court to disqualify witnesses, it seems unlikely
that material witness cases will join civil cases, deportation
cases, Fourth Amendment habeas cases, grand jury matters, and
sentencing issues, as legal vehicles where the exclusionary rule
is not applicable.
IV.

THE MISUSE OF MATERIAL WITNESS LAWS:
INVESTIGATORY DETENTION

There are documented instances of the use of material
witness laws as a pretext to detain individuals while a criminal
investigation against them is underway, or until formal criminal
245 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978). A defendant must establish

that his or her own rights were violated by the government activity before any
evidence will be excluded. It is not sufficient that someone else's rights may have
been violated. See id. at 139. Thus, even if a material witness' rights were somehow
violated, possibly by the unjustified arrest, the defendant would have no basis to
object. Further, this may be a logically impossible circumstance. The witness either
has something to offer, thus providing at least a partial basis for their seizure, or if
the witness has nothing to offer, there is nothing to suppress.
246 United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 276 (1978). The willingness of the
witness to testify was an important, but not crucial, factor. Id. at 276-77 (noting
that the more willing a witness is to testify, the less likely an illegal search is
needed to find such a witness).
247 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450 (1974)
(holding that testimony of a witness the police discovered through statements of the
defendant obtained in violation of Mirandais admissible). In Miranda v. Arizona,
the Court held that a person in custody must be advised of the right to silence and
counsel, and appointment of counsel if indigent, prior to interrogation. Miranda,
384 U.S. at 468-73. Further, a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of those
rights must be established prior to custodial interrogation. Id. at 475.
248 See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 433. Tucker was questioned after being taken into
custody, but he was not given complete warnings. His answers led the police to a
witness who could provide incriminating testimony. Id. at 436. The Supreme Court,
in an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, was unwilling to consider witnesses as
suppressible "fruit" of the Mirandaviolation. Id. at 457 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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charges could be filed against them.
Such "investigatory
detentions" are not the intended purpose of the material witness
laws.
For instance, convicted Oklahoma City bombing coconspirator Terry Nichols was originally arrested as a material
witness, then held by the FBI until charged. 249 In United States
ex rel. Allen v. LaVallee,250 the appellant was arrested and held
as a material witness for eight days before confessing to a
homicide he had allegedly only witnessed. 25 1 The court upheld
the detention as proper, even though no criminal proceeding was
pending against anyone at the time the "witness" was taken into
252
custody.
Similarly, In re De Jesus Berrios253 is a case where the
appellant challenged his incarceration as a recalcitrant witness
after disobeying a grand jury subpoena to provide hair samples
and appear in a lineup. 25 4 He argued that the federal material
witness statute permitted detention only to obtain testimony, not
demonstrative evidence. 255 The court rejected his argument and
found that the arrest was proper since it was based upon the
witness's noncompliance with earlier subpoenas that sought his
testimony, not exemplars or an appearance in a lineup. 256 Even
though the subpoena requiring the demonstrative evidence was
served after the witness was arrested, the court refused to find
that the earlier "testimony" subpoenas were a subterfuge meant
25 7
to obtain forms of evidence not allowed by statute.
2
5
In Awadallah, 8 the court dismissed perjury charges
against the defendant, held as a material witness, because of
concern that the Government was using the material witness
law as a pretext for holding Awadallah while investigating the
249

In

re Material Witness Warrant Nichols, 77 F.3d 1277, 1278 (10th Cir.

1996).
250

411 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1969).

251
252

Id. at 242.
Id. at 244.

253

706 F.2d 355 (1st Cir. 1983).

254

Id. at 356.
Id. at 357.
Id. at 357 & n.2. The court refused to construe the word "testimony" as used

255
256

in the federal material witness statute, stating, "The word 'testimony' in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3149 may in fact be broad enough to include nonverbal evidence such as hair
samples. We need not reach that question, however .
Id. at 357 n.2.
257

Id. at 358.

255

202 F. Supp. 2d 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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September 11th terrorist attacks. 25 9 The court emphasized that
allowing the detention of grand jury witnesses under the
material witness statute would allow such investigatory
260
detentions to continue unchecked.
In another case related to the September 11th attacks,
United States v. Seif,26 1 the defendant was denied bail while an
investigation into his alleged activities was ongoing. 26 2 The
defendant was charged with making false statements on
applications to the Social Security Administration and the
Federal Aviation Administration. 263 The court denied bail,
finding the defendant to be a flight risk because of fear that "the
Government may choose, at a minimum, to hold him as a
material witness if multiple counts of conspiracy to commit
murder, likely capital offenses, and other serious crimes were
264
filed related to the September 11 terrorist attacks."
This dilemma, stemming from the absence of a statute
allowing law enforcement authorities to detain an individual
while investigating a crime potentially committed by that person
or his associates, has led to the misuse of the current material
witness law. This result is paradoxical because, even if Congress
passed such a law, it would be unconstitutional on several
265
grounds.
266
Constitutional law, specifically the Fourth Amendment,
requires the government to have probable cause to arrest and
detain. 267
An arrest or detention solely for investigative
purposes, other than a momentary stop of a citizen, would
violate a number of the detainee's rights, in addition to the right

259 Id. at 79.
260

Id.

261 CR 01-0977-PHX-PGR, 2001 WL 1415034 (D. Ariz. Nov. 8, 2001).
262 Id. at *5.
263 Id. at *3.

264 Id. at *4 (footnote omitted).
265 A statute can be constitutional on its face, yet unconstitutional in its
application.
266 The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
267 See United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982).
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to be free from "unreasonable" government searches and
268
seizures.
Further, the Fifth Amendment 269 right to remain silent is
potentially implicated whenever an individual is arrested as a
material witness since, arguably, the only way to end the
detention is to give a statement to the authorities.
Such
testimony, in many circumstances, may potentially incriminate
the material witness.
An investigatory detention that lasts beyond a few moments
also violates the Sixth Amendment 270 since it deprives a material
witness of the right to notice of criminal charges and the right to
a speedy and public trial, should an indictment ultimately be
rendered against the witness.
It could also be argued that a prolonged investigatory
detention, absent the probable cause needed for an arrest once
charges have been filed against the detainee, violates the
detainee's due process rights. Finally, the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment 271 would be
implicated if a federal investigatory detention statute were
passed. If an individual were detained solely for investigatory
purposes under such a statute, and later charged and convicted
of a crime, the time spent in custody during the investigation
would not be credited against his subsequent prison sentence.
See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985).
269 The Fifth Amendment states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
268

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
271 "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
270
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Related to the detention of material witnesses is the capture
and detention of thousands of enemy combatants by American
and allied forces in Afghanistan following September 11, 2001.
One of those detainees, Yaser Hamdi, was born in Louisiana and
is being detained as an enemy combatant in accordance with the
laws and customs of war. 272 Shortly after his capture, the
Federal Public Defender for the Eastern District of Virginia filed
a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the
Government's detention of Hamdi and naming himself as
Hamdi's "next friend."273 The public defender sought to meet
with Hamdi without the presence of military personnel or
monitoring by the Government. 274 The district court granted the
request and ordered that the attorney and Hamdi be allowed to
confer without any interference. The Government filed a motion
for stay pending appeal of the order, and the Fourth Circuit
focused on the plaintiffs standing to bring such a motion on
27 5
behalf of the detainee.
The doctrine of "standing," the court explained, requires the
276
plaintiff to have a personal stake in the outcome of a dispute.
Since Article III of the United States Constitution limits the
power of federal courts to actual cases and controversies,
standing is required to identify those cases that are
277
appropriately brought before the federal courts.
The court noted that a person who does not have Article III
standing may, nonetheless, proceed in federal court if he meets
the criteria to serve as "next friend" of an individual who does
279
have standing.278 The court examined Whitmore v. Arkansas,
a United States Supreme Court decision that addressed next
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598, 601 (4th Cir. 2002).
Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (stating that a habeas corpus petition can be
brought "by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his
behalf").
274 Hamdi, 294 F.3d at 602.
275 Id. A private citizen, Christian Peregrim, also filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus as "next friend" of Hamdi. The district court consolidated the Public
Defender's habeas petition with Peregrim's petition. Id. at 601-02.
276 Id. at 602; see Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984).
277 Hamdi, 294 F.3d at 602; see Friends for Ferrell Parkway, LLC v. Stasko, 282
F.3d 315, 320 (4th Cir. 2002).
278 Hamdi, 294 F.3d at 603. Next friend standing is often invoked on behalf of
death row inmates in order to seek a stay of execution. See, e.g., West v. Bell, 242
F.3d 338, 341 (6th Cir. 2001); Franklin ex rel. Berry v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429, 432
(6th Cir. 1998).
279 495 U.S. 149 (1990).
272

273
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friend standing. According to Whitmore, "next friend standing"
is "an accepted basis for jurisdiction ... on behalf of detained

prisoners who are unable, usually because of mental
28 0
incompetence or inaccessibility, to seek relief themselves."
The "next friend" does not "become a party to the habeas corpus
action in which he participates, but simply pursues the cause on
behalf of the detained person, who remains the real party in
28
interest." '
The Whitmore court, however, cautioned that next friend
standing is not available unless certain criteria are met:
Most important for present purposes, "next friend" standing is
by no means granted automatically to whomever seeks to
pursue an action on behalf of another. Decisions applying the
habeas corpus statute have adhered to at least two firmly
rooted prerequisites for "next friend" standing. First, a "next
friend" must provide an adequate explanation-such as
inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability-why
the real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf to
prosecute the action. Second, the "next friend" must be truly
dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he
seeks to litigate, and it has been further suggested that a "next
friend" must have some significant relationship with the real
party in interest. The burden is on the "next friend" clearly to
establish the propriety of his status and thereby justify the
28 2
jurisdiction of the court.
These restrictions are necessary, the Whitmore court
explained, because "it was not intended that the writ of habeas
corpus should be availed of, as matter of course, by intruders or
28 3
uninvited meddlers, styling themselves [as] next friends."
The Hamdi court determined that Hamdi met the first
28 4
prong of the Whitmore analysis because he was inaccessible.
Whitmore, however, also requires a "significant relationship"
between the proposed next friend and the real party in
interest. 28 5 Here, the public defender conceded that he had no
relationship with the detainee before seeking to intervene on

280

Id. at 162.

281
282
283

Id. at 163.

284

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598, 603 (4th Cir. 2002).
Id. (citing Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163-64).

285

Id. at 163-64 (citations omitted).

Id. at 164.
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Hamdi's behalf.2 86 This concession proved fatal to the plaintiffs
case since the court concluded that the significant relationship
inquiry is "an important requirement for next friend
standing."28 7 Although the court declined to decide "just how
significant the relationship between the would-be next friend
and the real party in interest must be in order to satisfy the
requirements for next friend standing... [iut suffices here to
conclude that no preexisting relationship whatever is
288
insufficient."
Although the court did not doubt the sincerity of the public
defender, it felt that it must require a significant, pre-existing,
relationship with the real party in interest:
There [would be] no principled way to distinguish a Public
Defender from someone who seeks simply to gain attention by
injecting himself into a high-profile case, and who could
substantiate alleged dedication to the best interests of the real
party in interest by attempting to contact him and his
28 9
family.

The court concluded by stating:
The question of next friend standing is not merely "technical,"
as the district court surmised. Rather, it is jurisdictional and
thus fundamental. The Court in Whitmore rejected the idea of
employing "notions of what might be good public policy to
expand our jurisdiction in an appealing case." Because neither
the Public Defender nor Peregrim has any prior relationship
whatever with Hamdi, each fails to satisfy an important
jurisdictional prerequisite for next friend standing ....
Jurisdictional limitations have their roots in the respect courts
owe the other branches of our government. The structural
restraints of separation of powers are important and serve in
their own fashion to safeguard the sacred charter of our
290
rights.
Hamdi's father filed a petition seeking to intervene as next
friend after the court of appeals heard oral arguments on the
286
287
288

Id. at 601.
Id. at 604.
Id. The court noted that its decision was in accord with other circuits that

have examined this issue. Id.; see Massie v. Woodford, 244 F.3d 1192, 1194 (9th Cir.
2001); T.W. v. Brophy, 124 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 1997); Amerson ex rel. M.H. v.
Iowa, 59 F.3d 92, 93 n.3 (8th Cir. 1995); Zettlemoyer v. Horn, 53 F.3d 24, 27 n.4 (3d
Cir. 1995).
289 Hamdi, 294 F.3d at 605.
290 Id. at 607 (citations omitted).
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case. In a subsequent ruling on the father's petition as his son's
next friend, the court of appeals reversed the district court's
order that allowed unrestricted access to court-appointed
counsel. 29 1 In reversing the district court, the court of appeals
noted that "a court's deference to the political branches of our
national government is considerable." 292 The court further
reasoned:
This deference extends to military designations of individuals
as enemy combatants in times of active hostilities, as well as to
their detention after capture on the field of battle. The
authority to capture those who take up arms against America
belongs to the Commander in Chief under Article II, Section 2.
As far back as the Civil War, the Supreme Court deferred to the
President's determination that those in rebellion had the status
of belligerents. And in World War II, the Court stated in no
uncertain terms that the President's wartime detention
decisions are to be accorded great deference from the courts. It
was inattention to these cardinal principles293of constitutional
text and practice that led to the errors below.
The court of appeals was disturbed that the district court
allowed counsel unmonitored access to Hamdi without the
benefit of allowing the Government to file a response to the
Indeed, the court noted that "[t]here is little
lawsuit. 294
indication in the order (or elsewhere in the record for that
matter) that the court gave proper weight to national security
concerns."295
The court of appeals refused to dismiss the
petition, however, noting such an action "would be as premature
as the district court's ... order. '296 Rather, the court chose to
defer to the political branches of government on the issue of
Hamdi's status as an "enemy combatant" and the implications
297
inherent therein.

291

Hamdi ex rel. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 279 (4th Cir. 2002).

292

Id. at 281.

293

Id. at 281-82 (citations omitted).

Id. at 282.
Id.
29G Id. at 283.
297 The court noted:
It has long been established that if Hamdi is indeed an 'enemy combatant'
who was captured during hostilities in Afghanistan, the government's
present detention of him is a lawful one. Separation of powers principles
must, moreover, shape the standard for reviewing the government's
designation of Hamdi as an enemy combatant. Any standard of inquiry
294
295
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In United States v. Awadallah,298 the presiding judge, Shira
A. Scheindlin, issued four opinions and orders covering
approximately 150 pages. 299 Her opinions make clear that the
defendant, originally arrested as a material witness and held as
such until arrested on a perjury complaint, was subjected to
abuse utterly inconsistent with the treatment of innocent
persons, including witnesses. 3 0
Anyone reading Judge
Scheindlin's opinions will sense her outrage at the treatment of
301
this defendant while in government detention.
Nonetheless, the court improperly concluded that a person
may not be detained for a grand jury investigation as a witness.
The court reached this conclusion by discounting prior case
30 3
law, 302 which clearly sanctioned such governmental action.
Furthermore, a witness may be detained under the authority of
the All Writs Act. 304 Thus, any false statement to a grand jury
would not, contrary to Judge Scheindlin's opinion, need to be
suppressed.
Judge Scheindlin, alternatively, found there was no
legitimate basis to detain Awadallah, even if the material
witness statute was applicable. 305 Specifically, the court found
there was no probable cause for the material witness arrest
warrant and that the underlying affidavit was riddled with
misrepresentations. 30 6 The court concluded that the egregious
nature of the agent's misrepresentations justified the resulting
suppression of Awadallah's perjurious statements before the
30 7
grand jury.

must not present a risk of saddling military decision-making with the
panoply of encumbrances associated with civil litigation.

Id. at 283-84 (citations omitted).
298 202 F. Supp. 2d 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
299 See 173 F. Supp. 2d 186 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("Awadallah1"); 202 F. Supp. 2d 17
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("AwadallahIT'); 202 F. Supp. 2d 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Awadallah
IIP'); 202 F. Supp. 2d 82 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Awadallah V").
300 See Awadallah III, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 59-61; Awadallah /V, 202 F. Supp. 2d
at 85-96.
301 See Awadallah III, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 59-61; Awadallah IV, 202 F. Supp. 2d
at 85-96.
302 See, e.g., Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971).
303 Awadallah III, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 72-76.
304 See supra Part III.E.
305 Id. at 55.
306 Id. at 80-82.
307 Id.
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The court's findings in Awadallah were very fact-specific.
Another judge might have reached a different result. Judge
Scheindlin's theory, that but for an improper arrest there would
have been no testimony before a grand jury or that Awadallah's
testimony might have been different if the grand jury
appearance were pursuant to a subpoena, 308 is beside the point.
An unlawful arrest is not a license to lie. This is an issue that
has long been decided. 30 9 Even if the All Writs Act was not
applicable, if there was no probable cause, and if the officers lied
in the affidavit, the fact remains that witnesses cannot lie with
impunity.
It is still possible that Judge Scheindlin properly excluded
the statements of Mr. Awadallah.
Her opinions do not
specifically address the possibility that Awadallah's grand jury
testimony, given after twenty days of abusive captivity, was
coerced. If his statements were coerced, due process would keep
them from being used for any purpose, even as the basis for a
perjury prosecution. 310
Threats of physical violence-and
3 11
certainly actual violence-can result in a finding of coercion.
Such coerced statements are already excluded by the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 3 12 Thus, Judge Scheindlin may still be
correct, albeit for the wrong reasons.
V.

PROPOSED CHANGES TO MATERIAL WITNESS LAWS

At present, the federal material witness statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3144, requires a showing of probable cause to detain a

308

Id.

309

See United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 127-28 (1980). A witness who

has received a grant of immunity has no right to lie, even though immunized
testimony cannot be used against him. This is true even for impeachment purposes.
Evidence of lying can indeed be used in a subsequent perjury prosecution. Id.
310 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 401-02 (1978). In Mincey, the Supreme
Court held that statements obtained from a defendant in a hospital could not be
used against him at trial where it was apparent from the record that they were not
"the product of his free and rational choice." Id. at 401 (quoting Greenwald v.
Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 521(1968)). Although statements made by a defendant in
violation of Miranda v. Arizona, are admissible for impeachment purposes if their
"trustworthiness... satisfies legal standards," any use of a defendant's involuntary
statement is a denial of due process of law. Id. at 397-98 (citations omitted).
311 See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (finding that a government
informant scared a fellow inmate into confessing by simply saying that child killers
face danger from other inmates).
312

See FED. R. EVID. 403.
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witness. 3 13 When a witness is arrested as material, he is
processed by the authorities under the Bail Reform Act, as any
other arrestee, and brought before a federal magistrate to
address the issue of bond.
The current federal material witness statute, however, is far
from perfect. A number of beneficial changes could be made to
the statute to provide more protection for the witness while not
compromising the intended purposes of the material witness law
itself. The current statute is also confusing and ambiguous, as
demonstrated by the various interpretations given to it by
federal courts around the country.
Such a proposed model statute could read as follows:
If it appears from an affidavit supported by probable cause, and
filed by a party, or potential party or representative thereof,
that the testimony of a person is material in a criminal
proceeding, including grand jury and other pre-trial
proceedings, and if it is shown that (1) it may become
impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena,
and (2) the witness will flee the jurisdiction or otherwise
become unavailable unless arrested, a judicial officer may order
the arrest of the person and treat the person in accordance with
the provisions of section 3142 of this title. The witness must be
taken before a federal magistrate within twenty-four hours of
arrest on the warrant. The magistrate must notify the witness
of the right to counsel and the right to request the government
conduct a deposition in lieu of detaining the witness. The
presumption that the witness is entitled to bail should apply in
each case. No material witness may be detained because of
inability to comply with any condition of release if the
testimony of such witness. can adequately be secured by
deposition. Release of a material witness may be delayed for a
reasonable period of time, but in any event no longer than
seven days, until the deposition of the witness can be taken
pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The witness should be notified of the deposition alternative
at the initial court appearance. The judicial officer should
inquire of the detainee at that early stage if such a procedure
would be acceptable, and if so, the parties should begin exploring
that option. Care should be taken to ensure this is not coercive.

313 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000).
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If a material witness is merely a witness, and not a potential
defendant, this is not a problem.
There should also be assurances that the witness is not the
target of a criminal investigation. For instance, the material
witness statute could expressly provide for immunity of the
witness from prosecution in certain cases, thereby insuring that
no criminal charges will be forthcoming.
The material witness statute should not be used as a pretext
to charging an individual with a crime. Perhaps one way to
prevent this would be to require a stricter showing of probable
cause by the government. The present standard requires a
showing that the testimony of the witness is material, and that it
is impracticable to secure the witness's presence by subpoena.
Perhaps a further requirement should be added, such as a
showing that the witness will flee the jurisdiction absent arrest
and detention.
The material witness law could require the filing of an
affidavit by the government asserting that the witness will not
be charged with a crime, or is not the target of a federal
investigation. This "guarantee" could be revoked only upon the
discovery of independent evidence that was unavailable at the
time the affidavit was presented to the court.
Another way to prevent the misuse of the material witness
statute could be to provide for certain punishments upon misuse.
For instance, the statute could be amended to provide for the
dismissal, with prejudice, of all criminal charges if the
government has attested that criminal charges would not be
filed, and good cause is not shown why such charges were later
filed against the witness. In addition, the statute could waive
governmental immunity from a civil cause of action for damages,
brought by the witness, if the government either filed an earlier
affidavit indicating criminal charges would not be brought and
they subsequently were, or if a person is held as an investigatory
detainee and subsequently charged with a crime.
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO MATERIAL WITNESS DETENTION

There are alternatives to the imprisonment of material
witnesses available at the present time that are meant to ensure
the presence of those witnesses at any criminal proceeding
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where their testimony is required. 314 Formal use of the material
witness laws-and the accompanying punitive treatment of
witnesses-should be the last resort of law enforcement. For
instance, witnesses located within a state are subject to the
judicial and police powers of that state.315 Thus, a violation of a
court order to appear subjects the witness to penalties for
contempt of court. 3 16 In federal grand jury proceedings, a
witness who ignores a grand jury subpoena is also subject to the
contempt powers of the court, which can be considerable.
Witnesses located outside of a state are subject to the
Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses.3 17 This Act
has been adopted in all fifty states, plus the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. 313 It secures the attendance
of material witnesses located within a state for criminal trials in
other states, and vice versa. 319 Under the Act, a judge certifies
that an individual is a material witness in a criminal prosecution
or grand jury investigation within a state. A hearing is then be
held in the state where the witness is found. If the judge
determines that the witness is material, that no undue hardship
will occur if he is compelled to attend and testify, and that he
will not be subject to arrest or service of process in the other
state, then the judge issues a summons ordering the witness to
appear and testify in the other state. If the witness does not
present himself as ordered, he can be punished through the
contempt power of the court in the state that ordered his
attendance.
Moreover, every person in the United States is subject to the
Federal Fugitive Felon Act, which makes it a federal crime to
flee a jurisdiction for the purpose of avoiding the giving of
testimony in a criminal proceeding. 320 The Act provides, in
relevant part:

314 Ronald L. Carlson, Jailingthe Innocent: The Plight of the Material Witness,
55 IOwA L. REV. 1, 2 n.2, 16-17 (1969) (discussing Hearings on S. 1357 before the
Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights, S. Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong. 304 (1965)).
315 Id. at 16.

Id.
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.92 (West 2002) (State of Michigan's
version of the Act).
318 See id. § 767.91 (containing a table of jurisdictions where the Act has been
adopted).
319 See id. §§ 767.92, 767.93.
320 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (2000).
316

317
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Whoever moves or travels in interstate or foreign commerce...
(2) to avoid giving testimony in any criminal proceedings in
such place in which the commission of an offense punishable by
death or which is a felony under the laws of such place, is
charged, or (3) to avoid service of, or contempt proceedings for
alleged disobedience of, lawful process requiring attendance
and the giving of testimony or the production of documentary
evidence before an agency of a State... shall be fined under
321
this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Finally, as already discussed, Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 15, together with 18 U.S.C. § 3144, provide for the
taking of the deposition of the material witness to avoid
unnecessary detention and hardship.
CONCLUSION
The debate over the treatment of material witnesses is one
that is likely to continue for many years to come. As long as
there are individuals whose information is deemed important by
litigants in both state and federal courts, there will be material
witnesses. The critical issue which must be addressed in the
future, however, is whether the detainment of individuals will
continue in its present form, especially the detainment of
individuals for investigatory purposes. Perhaps the continual
analysis of the material witness issue will open the subject to
public discussion and, ultimately, reform.
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